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Although most of the marginalist economists’ methodology was influenced by 19th 
century classical physics, the work of second generation marginalist Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth represents the highest point of classical physics influence to the 
development of mainstream economic methodology. Edgeworth’s close parallelism 
between celestial and social mechanics expressed in his analogies between utility and 
energy and the principle of utility maximization to maximum energy, are important 
indications of the physics scientific ideal for economics. Subsequent leading theorists 
were not as explicit, although economic theory continued to be influenced by physics 
scientific ideal as the work of Pareto, Fisher and Samuelson indicates. However, the 
physics methodological framework has made a recent reappearance in the relatively 
new field of econophysics. Although there are methodological similarities, there are 
also important differences between mainstream economics and econophysics. 
Econophysicists’ emphasis to statistical mechanics rather to mechanical models, their 
reservations towards rational agent theory and their rejection of many standard 
assumptions of mainstream economics, are examples of such differences. This might 
also explain the resistance of mainstream economic theorists to incorporate 
econophysics into economics. The paper examines the above from a methodological 
viewpoint. It also discusses the possible reasons for this historical development and its 
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I. Introduction 
 The physics methodological ideal has been extremely influential for the 
formation of mainstream economic methodology (Mirowski, 1989). Although, there 
were indications of this ideal in classical economic thought (e.g. Adam Smith’s 
reference to astronomy), the decisive turn took place with the emergence of 
marginalism. The introduction of marginal analysis was combined with the systematic 
use of mathematics by Jevons and Walras in their effort to make economics an exact 
science in the manner of physics (Mirowski, 1989; Dow, 2002). However, the work of 
second generation marginalist, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth represents the highest point 
of classical physics influence to the development of mainstream economic 
methodology. Although his contribution in this respect has not been widely 
appreciated, Edgeworth not only applied formalism and methods from physics to the 
study of economic phenomena, but he also provided the methodological justification. 
Edgeworth’s approach dominated the bulk of orthodox economic methodology as the 
subsequent works of Pareto, Fisher and more recently Samuelson, demonstrate. The 
mathematical methods employed in their work, were very similar to the ones used in 
mathematical physics and especially to those of classical mechanics (Drakopoulos, 
1994). 
 The more recent history of mainstream economic methodology indicates that 
the physics ideal was toned down although the methods were basically unchanged. 
However, the physics scientific ideal has made a recent reappearance in the relatively 
new field of econophysics. Contrary to previous developments, most of 
econophysicists’ work originates from physics (Gingras and Schinckus, 2012). 
Although most of econophysicists acknowledge their intellectual debt to the above 
figures, there are important methodological differences between mainstream 
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economics and econophysics (e.g. Burda et al, 2003; Ball, 2006). Econophysicists’ 
emphasis to statistical mechanics rather to mechanical models, their serious 
reservations towards microeconomic foundations and their explicit rejection of 
rational agent theory as well as of standard concepts such as utility, are clear 
examples of such differences. Thus, it seems that contrary to the physicalism of 
marginalists, the physics ideal proposed by econophysicists does not combine very 
well with the established theory and method of orthodox economics. In addition, most 
econophysicists are highly critical of economic methodology to the extent that some 
of them call for its complete rejection (e.g. McCauley, 2004). The dominant orthodox 
reaction is to ignore the challenge, and when they respond, their reaction is rather 
subdued, implying a certain methodological discomfort. 
 The paper traces the development of physics scientific ideal in economics 
starting from the vital contribution of Edgeworth and proceeding to Pareto, Fisher and 
Samuelson. The next section discusses the emergence of econophysics and its main 
methodological approach in studying economic phenomena. Section four examines 
the differences of econophysics from orthodox economics and also their uneasy 
relationship. The next section focuses on the possible implications for mainstream 
economic methodology and the final section concludes. 
 
 
II. Edgeworth’s Methodological Ideal 
 
A contemporary of Marshall, Edgeworth is considered to be one of the most 
influential figures of marginalism and of the early neoclassical economics. Apart from 
his well-known contributions to contract theory, the theory of monopoly and duopoly 
and taxation theory, his methodological approach was extremely influential for the 
subsequent development of mainstream economic methodology. Edgeworth’s most 
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important contribution “Mathematical Psychics: An Essay of the Application of 
Mathematics to Moral Sciences” (1881) sets the basis for the methodological 
justification of formalism in social sciences and particularly in economics. The 
subsequent influence of this work has not been fully appreciated by economic 
methodologists. Although there were previous methodological justifications for the 
use of formalism in economics (e.g. Cournot, Jevons, Walras), Edgeworth provides a 
very systematic methodological grounding for the use of mathematics in the study of 
social phenomena and more importantly of the methodological ideal of physics. It can 
be argued that his work represents the height of the physics emulation in the history of 
economic thought. 
In the very first page of the introduction of the Mathematical Psychics, he sets 
his basic idea of the close analogy between economics and physics:  
An Analogy is suggested between the Principles of Greatest Happiness, 
Utilitarian or Egoistic, which constitute the first Principles of Ethics and 
Economics, and those Principles of Maximum Energy which are among the 
highest generalizations of Physics and in virtue of which mathematical 
reasoning is applicable to physical phenomena quite as complex as human life 
(Edgeworth, 1881, p. v). 
 
In the process of his methodological justification, Edgeworth discusses the nature of 
the relations in economics with those in physics. He argues that the lack of precise 
numerical data and exact functional relations in economics is not an obstacle to the 
application of mathematical methods. In particular, he provides an example from 
hydrodynamics where the relations among variables are central (Edgeworth, 1881, pp. 
4, 5). Edgeworth’s purpose was to employ the methods of mathematical physics to 
social science. He continues by stating: 
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The application of mathematics to the world of soul is countenanced by the 
hypothesis (agreeable to the general hypothesis that every psychical 
phenomenon is the concomitant, and in some sense the other side of a physical 
phenomenon), the particular hypothesis adopted in these pages, that Pleasure is 
the concomitant of Energy. Energy may be regarded as the central idea of 
Mathematical Physics; maximum energy the object of principal investigations in 
that science. By aid of this conception we reduce into scientific order physical 
phenomena, the complexity of which may be compared with the complexity 
which appears so formidable in Social Science (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 9). 
 
Thus, the correspondence between physical and social phenomena is an important 
methodological reason for the physics scientific ideal. Furthermore, Edgeworth 
provides another fundamental reason for the application of mathematics to economics 
which is the quantitative nature of the discipline. Quantity of labour, quantity of 
pleasure, quantity of sacrifice and enjoyment, greatest average happiness are cited as 
main examples of the quantitative nature of economics (Edgeworth, 1881, pp. 97, 98). 
  Edgeworth combined Utilitarianism with economics under the methodology of 
“mathematical psychics” (see also Creedy, 1980; Mirowski, 1994). Therefore, the 
central idea of the “Hedonic Calculus” is the maximization of utility which naturally 
facilitates the application of optimization methods from physics to economics. The 
following statement is indicative: 
Now, it is remarkable that the principal inquires in Social Science may be 
viewed as maximum-problems. For Economics investigates the arrangements 
between agents each tending to his own maximum utility; and Politics and 
(Utilitarian) Ethics investigate the arrangements which conclude to the 
maximum sum total of utility. Since, then, Social Science, as compared with the 
Calculus of Variations, starts from similar data -loose quantitative relations-and 
travels to a similar conclusion –determination of maximum- why should it not 
pursue the same method, Mathematics? (Edgeworth, 1881, pp. 6, 7) 
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Given the above statements, psychophysics represents the aim of a unified science of 
physical and mental phenomena. Thus, he often cites with enthusiastic approval 
contemporary works in psychology and especially the work of psychophysicists such 
as Weber, Fechner, and Wundt (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 60).1 Furthermore, he was 
extremely keen in incorporating the findings of psychophysics into the economic and 
utilitarian calculus (see also Collander, 2007). A good example in this respect, is 
Fechner’s Law which relates the quantity of sensation to the quantity of stimulus 
(intensity of stimulus), and the stimulus threshold. In his previous work (Edgeworth, 
1877), he modified this “Law” in view of his subsequent hedonic calculus as follows: 
pi = k|f (y)− f (β ) 
 
pi is a pleasure function and it is an increasing concave function of the stimulus,  y is 
the quantity of stimulus, β denotes the sensibility to the stimulus of the sentient, i.e. 
the threshold, and k denotes the capacity for pleasure. The first differential of this 
function is positive and the second is negative (Edgeworth, 1877, p. 42). He will 
employ this relationship in order to set a basis for his utilitarian calculus where he 
ultimately links it to the Bentham’s Greatest Happiness Principle and even to the 
Malthusian relationship between the quantity of food and the number of population 
(see also Newman, 1987, pp. 90-91). Moreover, Edgeworth contributed greatly to the 
spread of statistical methods in economics. His works “Methods of Statistics” (1885) 
and “Observation and Statistics” (1887) became extremely influential for the theory 
and application of statistical techniques to social and economic data (see also Stigler, 
1986; Baccini, 2007). 
In general, Edgeworth’s methodological approach is the peak of the 
combination of the application of mathematical physics to economics. His 
                                                 
1
 One can note here the contrast with the subsequent aversion by most orthodox theorists of 
incorporating research from psychology into economics (see also Lewin, 1996).   
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identification of maximum energy of physics with that of the maximum pleasure in 
economic calculus is his starting and also his central point. Moreover, his conception 
of man as a pleasure machine implies the legitimacy of incorporating psychophysics 
into economic theory. Therefore, his work represents the epitome of the attempt to 
transform economics into exact science in the manner of physics, through the 
adoption of the methodological tools of mathematical physics.  
 
III. Subsequent Developments 
After Edgeworth’s methodological justification of the physical science 
scientific ideal, there was further incorporation of mathematical methods in economic 
theory. As will be seen, this approach dominated fairly quickly the bulk of 
mainstream economic theorizing. The economic thinking expressed in the works of   
Pareto, Fisher, and more recently, Samuelson, contributed and facilitated the 
incorporation of this methodological ideal. 
Vilfredo Pareto’s well-known methodological position regarding positivism 
and social sciences, were influential for the formation of mainstream economic 
methodology (McLure, 2001). Pareto’s ideas were heavily based on the prevailing 
positivist scientific philosophy, a basic characteristic of which was the exclusion of all 
“metaphysical” and “non-scientific” elements from economics. Pareto’s 
methodological ideal of economics was that it should be a mathematical science, part 
of the natural sciences such as physiology, chemistry and mechanics (Pareto, 1896, p. 
21). This implies that economics should be freed from any philosophical or 
psychological ideas which hamper the application of the positivist methodology (for 
an extensive discussion, see Seligman, 1969; Drakopoulos, 1997; Dow, 2002). The 
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following quotation from Pareto captures the link between formalization, expulsion of 
metaphysical elements and the physics ideal: 
Thanks to the use of mathematics … the theory of economic science thus 
acquires the rigor of rational mechanics; it deduces its results from experience 
without bringing in any metaphysical entity (Pareto, 1971, p. 113). 
 
In the same manner as Edgeworth, the lack of formalism and the verbal mode of 
analysis that characterized social sciences were seen as a serious obstacle to the 
further progress towards the scientific status of the natural sciences. As he writes: 
All the natural sciences now have reached the point where the facts are studied 
directly. Political economy also has reached it, in large part at least. It is only 
in the other social sciences that people still persist in reasoning about words; 
but we must get rid of that method if we want these sciences to progress 
(Pareto, 1971, p. 10). 
 
Thus, the concept of scientific progression for the social sciences was clearly 
identified with the adoption of mathematical formalism, an idea which also dominates 
contemporary mainstream economic theorizing.2 
  One indicative example of Pareto’s belief in the analogy of physics and 
economics is the well-known Pareto’s Law referring to the distribution of income. 
Although Pareto denied that this relationship had the status of a physical law, he was 
convinced of its universal nature given that it involved statistical values that can be 
estimated (Pareto, 1897). As we shall see, Pareto’s law is one of the relations that 
econophysicists describe as power laws and falls into their domain. 
                                                 
2
 It should also be noted that in spite of the above, Pareto was careful regarding the 
application of the above to a model of economic man. In particular, Pareto admits that man’s 
character presents other characteristics too, but these are studied by other sciences. Pareto 
envisaged a general synthesis of all aspects of human action which would be the subject of 
the science of Sociology (see also Bruni and Guala, 2001; McLure, 2010). 
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The next figure who contributed to the formation of current ideas about 
method in economics was Irving Fisher who is considered to be one of the most 
important promoters of marginalism in America. In line with Edgeworth and Pareto, 
his methodological viewpoint is focused on the analogy between economics and 
physics. Given that one of Fisher’s doctoral supervisors was the theoretical physicist 
Willard Gibbs, it is not surprising that in order to complement the arguments in his 
doctoral thesis, he built an elaborate hydraulic machine with pumps and levers, 
allowing him to demonstrate visually how the equilibrium prices in the market 
adjusted in response to changes in supply or demand (Tobin, 1987). The following 
quotation provides the core of Fisher’s methodological viewpoint: 
The introduction of mathematical method marks a stage of growth –perhaps it 
is not too extravagant to say, the entrance of political economy on a scientific 
era (Fisher, 1892, p. 85). 
 
Apart from the above general methodological stance, Fisher promoted the 
specific mathematical methodology of optimization under constraints, that was to 
become standard in economic modeling.  As J. Tobin states: “On a remarkable range 
of topics, modern theorists adopt and build upon Fisherian ideas, sometimes 
unknowingly. Fisher’s methodologies, not just his use of mathematics but his explicit 
formulations of problems as constrained optimizations, is the accepted style of 
present-day theorizing” (Tobin, 1985, p. 34). This particular method was widely 
applied to problems in classical physics and especially classical mechanics.  
Furthermore, a substantial number of pages in Fisher’s most important work 
are devoted to the demonstration of the analogies between economics and physics. 
Fisher was convinced that terms from physics correspond to terms in economics, thus 
supporting explicitly the analogy between economics and classical mechanics. He 
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presents a list of terms that economists use and which have been employed from 
physics. Examples are: equilibrium, stability, elasticity, expansion, inflation, reaction, 
distribution (price), levels, movement, friction (Fisher, 1892, p. 24). He proceeds by  
constructing a table of correspondence between classical mechanics and economics. 
In this table, a particle in physics corresponds to an individual in economics. 
Likewise, force and work correspond to utility and disutility respectively. Other 
interesting examples are: the net energy of a particle may be defined as the total 
energy less total work and by analogy, the net utility or gain of the individual is the 
total utility less total disutility (Fisher, 1892, p. 85). 
 The next important step of the development of the physics ideal in economics 
is to be found in Paul Samuelson’s work and especially in his extremely influential 
Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947). One of the principal aims of this work was 
to build a formal theory of choice without resorting to “subjective” concepts such as 
utility or satisfaction (see also Wong, 1978). In a subsequent article reflecting on the 
formation of his ideas and especially of his Foundations, Samuelson emphasizes his 
influence and inspiration from the methodology of physics. As he writes: 
Perhaps most relevant of all for the genesis of Foundations, Edwin Bidwell 
Wilson (1879–1964) was at Harvard. Wilson was the great Willard Gibbs’s 
last (and, essentially only) protege at Yale. He was a mathematician, a 
mathematical physicist, a mathematical statistician, a mathematical economist, 
a polymath who had done first-class work in many fields of the natural and 
social sciences. I was perhaps his only disciple . . . I was vaccinated early to 
understand that economics and physics could share the same formal 
mathematical theorems (Euler’s theorem on homogeneous functions, 
Weierstrass’s theorems on constrained maxima, Jacobi determinant identities 
underlying Le Chatelier reactions, etc.), while still not resting on the same 
empirical foundations and certainties (Samuelson, 1998, p. 1376). 
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It is interesting to note though,  that in the last phrase of the last sentence, Samuelson 
admits an important difference between economics and physics: the lack of solid 
empirical foundations of economics. This is in contrast to Edgeworth’s and Fisher’s 
certainty of a close analogy between the two disciplines. 
 The modern subfield of financial economics is a representative example of an 
example of Samuelson’s influence. The mathematical techniques used nowadays in 
the study and the future behaviour of exchange-traded options markets, derivatives 
and other structured financial products, are based to a large extent on mathematical  
methods popularized by Samuelson (see also Lo and Mueller, 2010).  
 Thus, one can easily discern a common methodological position of the above 
three influential economists. In the spirit of Edgeworth, they strongly adhered to the 
physics analogy as the scientific ideal for economics. Moreover, the mathematical 
methods employed, were very similar to the ones used in mathematical physics and 
especially to those of classical mechanics. The basic common idea was the foundation 
of an economic agent characterized by utility maximization. This behavior can be 
approached mathematically and serve as a microeconomic basis for analyzing 
macroeconomic phenomena. Modern orthodox economic theory is therefore based on 
rational agent and employs most of the standard mathematical tools that Edgeworth 
and others introduced. 
 
III. Econophysics:  Emergence and Main Features  
As was discussed in the previous section, at least since the era of the 
marginalist revolution, there has been a long-established connection between physics 
and economics. The physical science constituted a methodological ideal for 
economics, thus economists should adopt-imitate the methodological approaches of 
physicists. The study of economic phenomena with the aid of models and methods of 
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physics has experienced a surge of interest through the emergence of “econophysics” 
in the 1990’s, which may be regarded as a new episode in the development of the 
above-mentioned relationship.  
The term “econophysics” has been coined in 1996 by the physicist Eugene H. 
Stanley and, obviously, this neologism originates from the contraction of “economics” 
and “physics” and “denotes the activities of physicists who are working on economics 
problems to test a variety of new conceptual approaches deriving from the physical 
sciences” (Mantegna and Stanley, 2000, pp. viii-ix). This new research field, mainly 
consisting of academic physicists, has grown rapidly in the last decade or so (see also 
the review by Gingras and Schinckus, 2012). It uses theories and methods of physics, 
specifically statistical physics, in order to describe and analyze economic and 
financial phenomena, such as the stock market functioning or the distribution of 
income.  
In most reviews of econophysics published mostly in mainly physics journals, 
econophysicists acknowledge the methodological link of their approach to early 
economics authors. For instance, they cite Adam Smith’s reference to astronomy as a 
possible model for scientific inquiry (Burda et al, 2003). They also point out the 
contributions to this aim of marginalists such as Jevons, Walras, Edgeworth, Fisher 
and Pareto emphasizing though, that their approach to modeling the economy was 
from classical mechanics and had the notion of equilibrium as a central concept 
(Burda et al, 2003, p. 2; Carbone et al, 2007). 
            There were various factors which contributed to the emergence and 
development of econophysics. The evolution of computer science facilitated the 
introduction of electronic transactions system in the 1980’s, making the collection and 
storage of huge amount of data easier. Physicists, accustomed to searching for 
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universal laws, considered that these economic data could be analyzed with the tools 
of statistical mechanics and statistical physics, attempting to find empirical 
regularities which are present and perceived in all markets. In addition, new 
mathematical tools and modern probability theory have encouraged research into the 
distribution of stock market variations, and generally financial behaviour. Financial 
data seems to follow a non- normal distribution due to the presence of fat tails which 
are better explained by power law distributions, first studied by Vilfredo Pareto in 
1897 with respect to income distribution. Non-Gaussian distributions and scaling laws 
are common in problems of physics like e.g. phase transition (see also Rickles, 2007). 
            Econophysicists regard “economic systems as complex systems whose internal 
microscopic interactions can generate macroscopic properties” (Schinckus, 2010c, p. 
3815). Modern financial markets can be characterized as complex systems, since they 
are “open” systems in which many sub-systems interact non-linearly in the presence 
of feedback. However, open systems are also influenced by external factors. For 
instance, the global financial market seems to behave like a complex system, in which 
the domestic financial markets are complex subunits interacting with the various 
business sectors or even individual firms.  
The fact that all economic agents and their actions are interdependent in the 
modern economic world and these interactions have a non-linear nature, gave rise to 
an attempt towards analyzing the afore-mentioned statement with the aid of the 
mathematics of chaos, a well-known tool among physicists. “The chaos theory has 
shown that unpredictable time series can arise from deterministic nonlinear economic 
systems and theoretical and empirical studies have investigated whether the time 
evolution of asset prices in financial markets might indeed be due to underlying 
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nonlinear deterministic dynamics of a relative limited number of variables” (Săvoiu 
and Iorga–Simăn, 2008, p. 31). 
 Although the bulk of econophysics work is focused on the financial 
economics, there are also many studies focusing on macroeconomic phenomena. It is 
interesting to note the lack of any reference to macroeconomic theory, thus implying 
the a-theoretical nature of this approach. The macroeconomic system is usually 
conceived as a large complex system similar to physical systems: 
An alternative approach is the search for universal laws which govern the 
behavior of the complex system. Such laws may uncover global regularities 
which are insensitive to tiny changes of parameters within a given class of 
parameters. Such laws also provide a classification of possible universal large 
scale behaviors which can occur in the system and which can be used as a first 
order approximation in the course of gaining insight into the mechanisms 
driving the system. This approach has been successfully used in theoretical 
physics for a long time … Macro-economical systems are in this respect very 
similar to field theoretical ones (Burda et al, 2003, p. 5). 
 
For most econophysicists, the conception of the macroeconomic phenomena in the 
above terms implies that the concept of a representative agent employed in most 
macroeconomic models is obsolete and useless. The appropriate methodology for 
examining these complex systems is the method of statistical physics or statistical 
mechanics. The widely used procedure involves the extraction of average properties 
of a macroscopic system from the microscopic dynamics of the systems (see 
Chakraborti et al, 2011a,b). 
The issue of wealth and income distribution is also another area where many 
econophysicists believe that economic theory is seriously lacking and that they can 
offer new insights. For most studies, the starting point is Pareto’s theory of 
distribution which may be written as: 
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N(x) = Ax -α 
where N(x) is the number of people having an income greater than or equal to x, and 
α is the Pareto coefficient which is measured empirically.  After discussing the lack of 
progress in empirical analysis done by economists, they advocate the use of methods 
from physics (e.g. Burda et al, 2003). Most econophysicists view this as a power law 
problem which can be analyzed starting from the “microscopic equation” that governs 
the dynamics of the evolution of wealth distributions which would lead to predicting 
the observed shape of wealth distributions (Chakraborti et al, 2011b; Lux, 2005). The 
following passage is indicative of the methodology employed: 
 
To explain such empirical findings, physicists have come up with some very 
elegant and intriguing kinetic exchange models in recent times ... Though the 
economic activities of the agents are driven by various considerations like 
“utility maximization”, the eventual exchanges of money in any trade can be 
simply viewed as money/wealth conserving two body scatterings, as in the 
entropy maximization based kinetic theory of gases (Chakraborti et al, 2011a, 
p. 992). 
 
The subsequent analysis is often conducted in terms of a close analogy between the 
kinetic theory of gasses and the kinetic theory of wealth. This means that there is a 
direct correspondence of concepts. As the following table indicates: 
 
 
 Kinetic Model Economy Model 
variable K (kinetic energy) x (wealth) 
units N particles N agents 
interaction collisions trades 
dimension integer D real number D 
equilibrium distribution the same the same 
 
(Chakraborti et al, 2011b, p.1027) 
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It is quite revealing that the above table resembles the table of correspondence 
between economics and physics terms and concepts found in Fisher’s work. It is also 
in the same spirit as Edgeworth’s close analogies between economics and physics 
concepts.  
The study of economic crises and cycles is also an increasingly popular topic 
for econophysicists especially since 2008. Their starting point is that the usual 
Gaussian framework adopted by many economists does not predict outliers; hence 
extreme phenomena are not likely to happen, a result that is also confirmed by the 
stability feature of the above-mentioned framework. Moreover, economic reality and 
in particular economic crisis, should not be explained through an atomistic 
reductionism, namely through (alleged) principles which govern the individuals’ 
behaviour. For econophysics, the microeconomic foundation of individual rationality 
is unnecessary and thus, no assumptions are made referring to agents’ behaviour: 
Economic and financial systems consist then of a large numbers of 
components whose interactions generate observable emergent properties 
(scaling laws) totally independent of microscopic details (individual 
behaviour) (Schinckus, 2010c, p. 3818). 
 
The alternative for econophysicists is to approach the problem of economic and 
financial crisis purely  in terms of a physical phenomenon and more specifically, as 
interactions between the various parts of the system such as firms, banks and 
households (e.g. Stanley et al, 2007). This means that “from this perspective, the 
analysis of a crisis phenomenon (and its repercussions on investment or consumption) 
becomes possible” (Schinckus, 2010c, p. 3818). As an indicative example, in order to   
tackle the evolution of the economic system, one influential paper employs “death and 
birth reactive lattice gas process” along a microscopic physics like approach in order 
 17
to describe a specific evolution of macroeconomic variables. This gas model takes 
into account the influence of an economic environment on the fitness and 
concentration evolution of economic entities (Ausloos et al, 2004). 
 
IV. Econophysics and Orthodox Economic Theory 
Most econophysicists realize some similarities with orthodox economics. As 
was pointed out above, they refer to the early attempts by economists to follow and 
adopt the methods from classical physics. However, they are also highly critical of 
contemporary economic theory and method. One of the most important criticisms is 
directed towards the use of tools from classical mechanics (e.g. constrained 
maximization) and of the Gaussian framework for empirical analysis. Standard 
economics often assume Gaussian normal distribution or some transformation of it. 
The Gaussian theory dates back to Bachelier, a French mathematician, who, five years 
before Einstein, in 1900, formulated the theory of Brownian motion in order to model 
the pricing of options in financial markets (Mantegna and Stanley, 2000). The mean-
variance approach to risk analysis constituted the development of the above-
mentioned theoretical framework, leading also to the formation of the famous Black-
Scholes formula of option-pricing (Black and Scholes, 1973). However, “the usual 
measure of risk through a Gaussian volatility is not always adapted to the real world. 
The tails of the distributions, where the large events lie, are very badly described by a 
Gaussian Law: this leads to a systematic underestimation of the extreme risks. 
Sometimes, the measurement of volatility on historical data is difficult, precisely 
because of the presence of these large fluctuations” (Bouchaud and Potters, 2000, p. 
107). 
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As was observed, econophysicists assert that financial and economic 
phenomena are best described and analyzed by adopting the tools of statistical 
mechanics or statistical physics. The different nature of reductionism compared to the 
one used in economics is central here. Orthodox economic theory follows atomistic 
reductionism in the sense that a fundamental assumption of mainstream economic 
analysis is rational economic behaviour at the individual level. According to this 
assumption, rational economic agents have adequate (or perfect) knowledge and 
information about the economic reality and their needs. Thus, they are always able to 
choose in an optimal way, viz. to choose the best possible solution. In addition, 
economic agents, acting in a perfectly competitive world, are usually assumed to have 
stable and invariable preferences. Econophysics also follows reductionism but of a 
totally different kind: econophysics is based on an interactive reductionism where 
complex phenomena can be described through interactions between their parts 
(Schinckus, 2010c, p. 3818). This implies that, “econophysicists do not care about 
rational agent theory. By considering that ‘market components’ (including traders, 
speculators, and hedgers) obey statistical properties, most econophysicists avoid the 
difficult task of theorizing about the individual psychology of investors” (Schinckus, 
2010b, p. 326). Econophysicists’ use of statistical mechanics tools to analyze 
statistical properties is therefore fully justified given the above methodological 
framework. 
This important distinction concerning the nature of reductionism has severe 
implications for the two research fields. In particular, econophysicists have been 
critics of conventional economic theory, thus distinguishing themselves from 
mainstream economics and finance. Some of them are quite dismissive regarding 
economic theory and econometrics. As the following statement indicates: 
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We have no mathematical model in mind a priori. We do not “massage” the 
data. Data massaging is both dangerous and misleading. Econometricians 
mislead themselves and others into thinking that their models help us to 
understand market behavior (McCauley, 2006, pp. 608). 
 
Econophysicists assert that “some striking empirical regularities (…) suggest 
that at least some social order is not historically contingent and perhaps is predictable 
from first principles” (Farmer et al, 2005, p. 38). Accordingly, one of the principal 
goals of this group of researchers has been to identify, measure, model and in some 
cases predict empirical regularities (ibid). Econophysics directs its attention to the 
interactions of the multiple components of the economic world that induce complex 
phenomena (Schinckus, 2010a). In this world, there is no guarantee that economic 
agents or individuals behave fully rationally, challenging thus the dominant 
neoclassical theory of rational choice.     
In the same spirit, econophysics claims that (financial) economics adopt an 
axiomatic and formal framework which is inappropriate for analyzing complex 
phenomena like those that often occur in the financial world. Some of them adopt the 
position that the link to economics should be severed: “To be quite blunt, all existing 
‘lessons’ taught in standard economics texts should be either abandoned or tested 
empirically, but should never be accepted as a basis for modelling” (McCauley, 2006, 
pp. 605-606). 
 Economics are based on an ex-ante realism stemmed from the development of 
abstract (a-priori) models, in contrast to a posteriori realism of econophysics which 
“in no way directed at the nature of hypotheses formulated ex-ante” (Jovanovic and 
Schinckus, 2011, p. 19). In particular, econophysicists assert that basic notions used in 
economic theory, such as equilibrium, representative agent, perfect rationality, etc., do 
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not have empirical justification and emerge only from a-priori beliefs (ibid). Adopting 
a different way of doing scientific research, econophysicists put emphasis on 
constructing (empirical) models using real data about the economic and financial 
world. The following statement is indicative of the way that most econophysicists 
perceive orthodox economics: 
…by basing all economic macro-phenomena on the rational representative 
agent, economists implicitly set the macro-level equal to the micro-level. The 
consequence is that all macro-concepts (e.g. the market, systemic risk, and a 
financial crisis) are misunderstood in economic theory (Schinckus, 2010c, p. 
3818). 
 
There are also more “extreme” methodological stances concerning the very 
foundations of orthodox theory. There are papers were the assumptions of utility 
maximization, perfect competition and diminishing marginal productivity are deemed 
empirically and logically flawed (Keen, 2003 and also McCauley, 2006). This 
naturally raises important questions regarding the long relationship between 
mainstream economics and physicalism. 
 
 
V. Methodological Discussion  
The methodological approach of econophysics has a very important empiricist 
dimension: a data-driven field, it commences empirically with real stylized facts, 
without any prior foundation to a theoretical model. The lack of providing an 
adequate theoretical framework to explicate the empirical phenomena examined has 
been regarded as one of the flaws of econophysics (e.g. Rosser, 2008; see also 
Kakarot-Handtke, 2013). Furthermore, econophysicists do not pay much attention to 
relevant studies in economics, magnifying thus the originality of their works and the 
significance of their results. Similarly, sometimes their assertions of discovering 
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universal economic laws seem to be extravagant and unreasonable. Finally, 
econophysicists work in areas where data sets are huge and reliable, however this is 
not the case for many fields of economics where data are problematic and inadequate. 
Consequently, important parts of economic theory may be ignored (see Rosser, 2008).   
In spite of the above, econophysicists’ methodological criticism towards 
mainstream economics and econometrics has not provoked a similar response from 
economists. It seems that the main line of defence against the attack is simply to 
ignore econophysics. A relevant study concerning the impact of econophysics to 
mainstream economics journal found that ‘‘mainstream’’ journals are not very open 
nor interested in publishing papers dedicated to econophysics (Gingras and 
Schinckus, 2012). Although there are a few economics journals that occasionally 
publish econophysics papers, the bulk of the literature is still published in physics 
journals.  
There are only a few papers though, that focus exclusively in responding to 
econophysicists methodological attacks. One of the few such papers by Gallegati, 
Keen, Lux, and Ormerod (2006) presents the following four concerns about 
developments within econophysics: 
1. a lack of awareness of work which has been done within economics itself, 
2. resistance to more rigorous and robust statistical methodology, 
3. the belief that universal empirical regularities can be found in many areas of 
economic activity, 
4. the theoretical models which are being used to explain empirical phenomena may 
have difficulties and limits (Gallegati et al, 2006, p. 2). 
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The above four concerns also illustrate some of the econophysics’ weaknesses and the 
possible paths that this newly-established discipline could follow in the near future in 
order to cope with these shortcomings 
On the other hand, the majority of (econo)physics-friendly economists 
considered that the new discipline of econophysics not only can enrich economics, but 
can also contribute towards the emergence and establishment of a “new economics” 
that is free from some of the dogmatic hypotheses characterizing the mainstream 
approach (e.g. the equilibrium idea) (Ball, 2006; Bouchaud, 2009). Furthermore, some 
other economists are willing to see a future cooperation along interdisciplinary lines. 
As Barkley Rosser (2008, p. 20) pointed out, “the newer understanding of the 
economic system will involve a greater transcendence of our traditional disciplinary 
and intellectual boundaries than we have been used to in the past, just as the ongoing 
evolution of market systems and the ever-increasingly complex nature of their 
dynamics and evolving fragility challenges our understanding in the real world”.         
However,  the reaction by the vast majority of mainstream economists seems 
to simply ignore econophysics and at best to engage in mild response given the 
explicit attack by econophysics to economic methodology. According to Gingras and 
Schinckus (2012), the reasons may be both methodological and sociological. The 
former has to do with the way that the two different fields do science (e.g. theory 
based vs. data driven methodology), while the latter concerns the sociological features 
of the two communities. The methodological gap between orthodox economics and 
econophysics may be regarded so huge that there is no reason for any contact due to 
the expected low value-added from exchanging views. The sociological aspect 
concerns the description of the economists’ community as “a conservative, novelty-
producing system since it rewards intellectual innovation only if it is directly in line 
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with the dominant research. All new fields that are not in accordance with the 
scientific standards used by the mainstream are ignored” (Gingras and Schinckus, 
2012, p. 134). 
 Apart from the above, another reason might be the methodological 
embarrassment that mainstream economists feel from the views of representatives of 
their scientific ideal. The following quotation is pointed directly to the 
epistemological status of economics:   
The position I now favor is that economics is a pre-science, rather like 
astronomy before Copernicus, Brahe and Galileo. I still hold out hope of better 
behavior in the future, but given the travesties of logic and anti-empiricism 
that have been committed in its name, it would be an insult to the other 
sciences to give economics even a tentative membership of that field (Keen, 
2011, p. 158). 
 
The long strive to achieve “exact science status” through the adoption of physics 
methods, is now challenged by physicists who are focusing on economic phenomena. 
Certainly, methodological criticism of mainstream economics has always been 
present, but it was mainly originating from heterodox economics schools, and to a 
certain extent, expected. It seems however, that mainstream economists are very 
uncomfortable of how to respond to attacks coming from their ideal model of science.  
 
VI. Concluding Comments 
 
The paper deals with the development of physics scientific ideal in economics 
starting from the vital contribution of Edgeworth to the new field of econophysics. 
Mainstream economic methodology has been substantially influenced by the physics 
methodological ideal, at least since the emergence of marginalism. The study of 
economic phenomena with the models and methods of physics has experienced a 
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surge of interest through the emergence of “econophysics” in the 1990’s, which may 
be regarded as a new episode in the development of the relationship between physics 
and economics.  
The paper has examined from a methodological viewpoint both the similarities 
and (mainly) the significant differences between mainstream economics and 
econophysics. Econophysicists’ emphasis to statistical mechanics rather to 
mechanical models, their reservations towards rational agent theory and their rejection 
of many standard assumptions of mainstream economics, are prime examples of such 
differences. Mainstream economic theorists’ response of this challenge is rather 
subdued, ignoring econophysics’ attack to economic methodology.  
 The modern reaction of orthodox economics to the challenge presented by 
econophysics is, however, very interesting. The physics methodological ideal has 
been crucial for the scientific status of orthodox economics at least since the 
marginalists. The recent attack to economics by econophysicists represents a rather 
surprising challenge by the very representatives of this scientific ideal. Thus, the lack 
of response by mainstream economics might indicate a certain methodological 
embarrassment. It seems that the long efforts to build scientific economics are now 
undermined by its methodological “mentors”. This development could lead to the re-
emergence of the discussion regarding the epistemological nature of economics as a 
discipline and also to a re-examination of the concept of scientific ideal. This might 
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